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  1Abstract 
 
It is now clear that we are in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. This crisis is the latest phase of the evolution of financial markets under the 
radical financial deregulation process that began in the late 1970s. This evolution has 
taken the form of cycles in which deregulation accompanied by rapid financial innovation 
stimulates powerful financial booms that end in crises. Governments respond to crises 
with bailouts that allow new expansions to begin. As a result, financial markets have 
become ever large and financial crises have become more threatening to society, which 
forces governments to enact ever larger bailouts. This process culminated in the current 
global financial crisis, which is so deep rooted that even unprecedented interventions by 
affected governments have thus far failed to contain it. In this paper we first analyze a 
series of structural flaws in the current financial system that helped bring on the current 
crisis, and then propose a nine point regulation policy, informed by our analysis, designed 
to end this destructive dynamic. We believe that if enacted and vigorously enforced, the 
policy could sharply reduce financial instability and minimize the problems caused by 
future financial cycles.  
  2  The U.S. Congress recently passed and George W. Bush signed into law a $700 
billion bank "bail-out" bill, bringing the total taxpayer funds committed to the financial 
rescue operation to over one trillion dollars. The bailout bill is severely flawed and may 
not achieve its stated aim of stabilizing financial markets. Lawmakers were stampeded 
into supporting the bill without insisting on proper safeguards over how the money would 
be spent, and even more importantly, without even attempting to gain commitments from 
financial institutions that they would accept serious regulation to prevent such a 
catastrophe from occurring again. Still, this is not the end of the story. The government 
may be coming back for more money soon if the recession continues to deepen and the 
bail-out funds prove inadequate. Moreover, as Barney Frank, House Financial Services 
Chairman, promised: "We will be back next year to do some serious surgery." The Wall 
Street Journal elaborates: "Mr. Frank wants legislation to rewrite housing finance -- 
including the roles of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- and overhaul 
regulation of financial services." (Wall Street Journal, "Historic Bail-out Passes as 
Economy Slips Further," October 4, 2008). 
  What kind of "surgery" should the government implement? Below we present a 
nine point program to "overhaul the regulation" of financial services. To explain the 
rationale for the plan, we first present a very brief description of key structural flaws in 
the financial structure that helped cause the current disaster. These flaws are explained in 
detail in Crotty 2008. In our discussion we use the term “New Financial Architecture” – 
or NFA - to represent the basic institutions and practices of today’s lightly regulated 
financial system.  
 
Key Structural Flaws of the New Financial Architecture  
First, support for light regulation of commercial banks, even lighter regulation of 
investment banks, and little if any regulation of the “shadow banking system”- hedge and 
private equity funds and the bank-created Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs) that 
contributed significantly to the creation of the crisis - is founded on the core assertion of 
neoclassical financial economics that capital markets price securities correctly with 
respect to their risk and return. Given accurate risk-return pricing, buyers and sellers of 
financial securities can make optimal decisions that lead to risk being held only by those 
  3capable of managing it. The celebratory narrative associated with the NFA states that 
relatively free financial markets minimize the possibility of financial crises and the need 
for government bailouts. Crotty 2008 explains that this theoretical cornerstone of the 
NFA is based on patently unrealistic assumptions and has no convincing empirical 
support. Thus, the ‘scientific’ foundation of the NFA is shockingly weak and its 
celebratory narrative is a fairly tale.  
Second, the current financial system is riddled with perverse incentives that 
induce key personnel in virtually all important financial institutions - including 
commercial and investment banks, hedge and private equity funds, insurance companies 
and mutual and pension funds - to take excessive risk. For example, banks get large fees 
to originate, securitize and service mortgages and distribute mortgages to capital markets 
whether these mortgages later default or not. Top investment bank traders and executives 
receive giant bonuses in years in which risk-taking behavior generates high profits that 
they do not have to give back when their reckless behavior causes their firms to collapse. 
Such asymmetric reward structures make it rational to take excessive risk in the bubble 
even if ‘rainmakers’ understand that a crash is likely to take place in the intermediate 
future. Or consider that credit rating agencies are paid by the investment banks whose 
complex derivative products they evaluate. It is therefore hardly surprising they gave 
high ratings to dangerous products during the bubble. The NFA operated with an 
incentive system virtually guaranteed to generate rapid financial growth fueled by 
excessive risk taking and dangerous levels of leverage. 
Third, the commonly accepted view was that banks were no longer risky because 
they sold loans to capital markets (the new ‘originate and distribute’ model of banking) 
and hedged whatever risk remained through credit default swaps. Both these propositions 
turned out to be myths. The banks kept hundreds of billions of dollars of very risky assets 
either on their balance sheets or as off-balance sheet items that they would ultimately be 
responsible for. In July 2008, the IMF estimated that global bank write-downs already 
exceeded $500 billion dollars. Meanwhile, the value of credit default swaps in 2008 was 
ten times larger then the available debt to be insured.  This market turned into a frenzied 
gambling casino that helped destroy insurance giant AIG and investment bank Bear 
Stearns, and caused widespread panic when Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail.  
  4Fourth, financial innovation has proceeded to the point where important 
structured financial instruments such as mortgage backed securities and collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) are so complex and so opaque that they are inherently non-
transparent. They do not trade on markets. Eighty percent of all derivatives are sold over-
the-counter (OTC) in deals negotiated between an investment bank and one or more 
customers. Indeed, the value of securities not sold on markets may exceed the value of 
securities that are. Thus, the claim that capital markets price risk optimally does not apply 
even in principle to these securities. Prices for these products are determined by the 
originating investment banks and ratings agencies through easy-to-manipulate black-box 
statistical models. Industry insiders said they were priced or ‘marked’ to magic or myth. 
Markets for such products are inherently illiquid. Buyers were plentiful in the boom 
because the returns were high and the products carried top ratings. But when the boom 
ended, the fact that no one knew what they were worth caused demand to evaporate and 
prices to plummet.   
Fifth, it was claimed that in the capital-marked based NFA, complex derivatives 
would allow the risk associated with any class of securities to be divided into its 
component parts. Investors could buy only the risk segments they felt comfortable 
holding. The global integration of financial markets allowed to be distributed around the 
world to whichever investors were best suited to deal with them. Rather than concentrate 
in banks as in the "Golden Age" financial system of the 1950's and 60's, risk would be 
lightly sprinkled on agents across the globe. Since markets priced risk correctly, no one 
would be fooled into holding excessive risk, so systemic risk would be minimized. But 
the NFA created and widely distributed extraordinary levels of risk, while structured 
financial instruments re-concentrated risk segments in astoundingly complex ways. And 
securitization and funding via global capital markets created channels of contagion in 
which problems originating in one location (the US subprime mortgage market) spread 
throughout the world, triggering a systemic crisis. 
Sixth, in the NFA banks were allowed to hold risky securities off their balance 
sheets, with no capital required to support them. Since capital had to be held against on-
balance-sheet assets, the regulatory system induced banks to move as much of their assets 
off-balance-sheet as possible. Off-balance-sheet special investment vehicles and conduits 
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but highly profitable securities such as CDOs. This was a dangerous game. The crisis 
destroyed the value of these illiquid assets and triggered an exodus from asset-backed 
commercial paper; the amount outstanding fell by $450 billion in the second half of 2007. 
This forced banks to take these devalued securities back onto their balance sheets, which 
forced capital write-downs and spread panic. 
Seventh, giant financial conglomerates were allowed to become so large and 
complex that neither insiders nor outsiders could accurately evaluate their risk. 
Conceding that outsiders regulators could not do this job, the Bank for International 
Settlement allowed banks to evaluate their own risk through statistical exercises such as 
Value at Risk (VAR).  Crotty 2008 demonstrates that VAR exercises are inherently 
flawed. These flaws led to a gross underestimation of risk in the financial boom that 
allowed banks to hold less capital than they should and take more risk than they should. 
This is just one of many examples of totally ineffective regulatory processes. Financial 
markets were not just lightly regulated in the NFA, such regulation as did exist was often 
‘phantom’ regulation designed to be ineffective.  
Eighth, the structural flaws in the NFA created dangerous leverage throughout the 
financial system. Financial market debt nearly doubled between 2000 and 2007. Just prior 
to the crisis, large investment banks had asset to equity ratios of 30 or more and some 
hedge funds were more highly levered. It is estimated that half of the spectacular rise in 
investment banking return on equity in the four years leading up to the crisis was 
attributable to higher leverage (Financial Times, “Worst period for investment banking in 
30 years,” April 2, 2008). Commercial banks appeared to be adequately capitalized, but 
only because a high percentage of their assets was hidden off-balance-sheet. In fact, they 
were excessively leveraged. By 2007 the global financial system had become, to use 
Hyman Minsky’s famous phrase, “financially fragile.” Any serious deterioration in the 
cash flows required to sustain security prices would trigger a dangerous de-leveraging 
process. Falling housing prices and rising defaults provided that trigger. As the value of 
mortgage backed securities fell, lenders demanded increased collateral for the loans used 
to purchase them. This forced borrowers to sell securities, accelerating the fall in prices in 
a vicious cycle that created a panic that no knows how to stop.  
  6It is time to break this ongoing cycle of deregulation, exotic financial innovation, 
boom, crash and bail-out. After every ‘rescue,’ financial markets become larger, more 
complex, more opaque, and more highly leveraged. The value of all financial assets in the 
US grew from four times GDP in 1980 to 10 times GDP in 2007. The share of corporate 
profits generated in the financial sector rose from 10% in the early 1980s to 40% in 2006. 
The latest financial crisis is so severe that it is not yet clear whether even government 
bailouts of unprecedented size can resolve it. We cannot permit the growth trajectory of 
financial markets in recent decades to continue; it is too dangerous. Financial markets 
must be reduced to a size relative to nonfinancial sectors that allows them to perform 
their basic productive services, but reduces the exotic gambling casino activities that have 
led to the current crisis and contributed dramatically to the rise in inequality in this era.  
We need an aggressive system of financial regulation that will be as effective as 
the one used in the US and other Western countries in the 1950's and 1960's. There can 
be no simple return to the past: the suggested agenda of reform that follows is tailored to 
current conditions. This program does not exhaust the list of regulatory changes that 
might be required to tame out-of-control financial markets. 
  
A Nine Point Program for Financial Regulation 
 
1. Restrict or eliminate off-balance sheet vehicles. 
Move all risky investments back on bank balance sheets and require adequate capital to 
support them. Capital requirements should be sufficient to protect bank solvency even 
during the liquidity crises that occur from time to time. As an illustration of the potential 
effectiveness of this proposal, consider that several years ago a group of Spanish banks 
approached the Spanish central bank asking permission to set up a network of Special 
Investment Vehicles that would allow them to profit from off-balance-sheet holdings of 
mortgage-backed collateralized debt obligations without setting aside capital to support 
them. The Spanish Central Bank demanded that these banks post an eight percent capital 
charge against SIV assets, just as they would have to do if they were on balance sheet. 
This stopped the innovation in its tracks (Financial Times, “Spain’s banks weather 
crisis", January 31, 2008). The Economist observed that “with no reason to set up the 
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lot of trouble by taking a similarly rigorous view of consolidation” (“Spanish Steps,” 
May 17, 2008). This sensible decision did not prevent Spain from enduring a housing-
related financial crisis, but it did eliminate one key element of the meltdown in the US 
and elsewhere. (See Financial Times, "Time for Central Bankers to Take Spanish 
Lessons," September 30, 2008). 
  
2. Require due diligence by creators of complex structured financial products. 
Require the investment banks that create mortgage backed securities, CDOs and other 
opaque mortgage backed financial assets to perform “due diligence” on the individual 
securities embodied in these products. “Due diligence” would obligate the issuer to 
evaluate the risks of each underlying mortgage, then use this information to evaluate the 
risk of the asset-backed security under varying conditions that might affect the value of 
the underlying mortgages. This task would be difficult and costly if done properly; it 
could make the most complex securities unprofitable. If this could not be done to 
regulators' satisfaction, sale of these securities should be prohibited. A related 
requirement should be that the underlying mortgages in a complex security must be 
identifiable, and ultimate ownership of these mortgages must be clear. Where this is not 
the case, securities cannot be ‘unwound’ in a crisis and the terms of the mortgage cannot 
easily be adjusted to stop the spread of defaults. Imposition of this requirement would 
probably close the market for CDOs and more complex securities based on CDOs.
1 At 
present, investment banks claim to assure the safety of these assets through over-
collateralization. For example, investors can buy tranches of the expected cash-flows 
from the mortgages in a CDO that will receive their payments before holders of riskier 
tranches do. Mathematical models are used to demonstrate the safety of such tranches 
under various adverse conditions, but these models have been shown to be totally 
unreliable under the threatening and uncertain conditions of the current crisis. A “due 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Rob Parenteau for suggesting this point about the need to unwind mortgage backed 
securities.  




3. Prohibit the sale of financial securities that are too complex to be sold on 
exchanges.  
Eighty percent of all derivative products and one hundred percent of the complex CDOs, 
credit default swaps and other exotic financial instruments implicated in the current crisis 
are traded off markets or over-the-counter. If regulators insisted that all derivative 
securities must be exchange traded, those OTC securities that could be simplified and 
commodified would shift to exchanges where they would be transparent, involve less 
counter-party risk, and be cheaper sources of finance. “Simpler products impose lower 
costs of credit analysis on end users, which in turn makes them less expensive sources of 
funding” (The Economist, “Ruptured credit,” May 17, 2008). The most complex 
products, including CDOs, cannot be sufficiently simplified and would disappear from 
the market. (See Financial Times, “Fed plan is spoilt by its backing of hypocrites,” April 
15, 2008, for one such proposal).  Of course, investment banks and hedge fund traders 
would not meekly accept such a proposal since writing and trading complex derivatives 
OTC is a source of huge profits (The Economist, “Clearing the fog,” April 19, 2008). A 
general ban on OTC derivative trading has one key advantage over attempts to prohibit 
specific products such as CDOs. Investment banks can evade regulations banning specific 
products or services by creating alternative products that are not identical, but perform 
the same functions. Prohibiting OTC products would eliminate this form of regulatory 
evasion. NFA supporters would argue that this reform would inhibit useful innovation, 
but it is now clear that the societal costs of such innovation - in terms of financial crises 
that cause or exacerbate real-sector problems and require government bailouts - far 
exceed their possible social benefits. (See Financial Times, "A New Formula," October 1, 
2008.)  
 
                                                 
2 Originating investment banks could also be required to retain ownership of a minimum percent of the 
securities they create sufficient to reduce their propensity to sell excessively risky products that come with 
overly optimistic risk ratings. This minimum would have to be quite large unless the perverse 
compensation incentives discussed in point 4 below are reduced substantially. 
  94. Transform financial firm incentive structures that induce excessive risk-taking. 
Perverse incentives for top decision makers in important financial firms is a major cause 
of the current crisis. This asymmetric pay structure has greatly exacerbated the inherent 
pro-cyclical behavior of financial markets. Without solving this key problem, it might not 
be possible to create an effective regulatory regime. One mechanism to make the pay-off 
structure more symmetrical, and thus reduce incentives for risk-seeking, would be to 
implement “clawbacks” through which excessive salaries and bonuses paid during the 
upturn would have to be repaid in the downturn.
3  Such clawbacks could be required in 
compensation contracts or could be implemented via the tax system, through a series of 
escrow funds and limitations on deductions from losses. Of course, there would be great 
incentives to engage in tax or restriction avoidance as is always the case. The appropriate 
response is not to stop trying to use appropriate taxes, but to enforce the tax laws more 
vigorously. Incentives to ratings agencies also need to change. If they were paid by 
institutional investors or associations of security buyers rather than the investment banks 
who sell complex products, the incentive to give excessively optimistic ratings would be 
eliminated. Alternatively, the government could create independent public ratings 
agencies that might function in a manner similar to the Government Accountability 
Office.  
 
5. Extend regulatory over-sight to the “shadow banking system.” 
The ‘shadow banking system’ of hedge and private equity funds and bank-created SIVs 
had become increasingly powerful. Though humbled by the current crisis, it is 
nonetheless still very much alive, waiting in the wings to revive if and when the crisis is 
over. This 'shadow banking system' played a key role in creating the conditions that led to 
the global crisis. These institutions must be brought under adequate regulatory control. 
Investment banks also played a crucial role in the NFA and bear substantial responsibility 
for creating the current crisis. Though the Fed does not regulate them, it was forced to 
bail them out. Dangerous risk taking caused the big five independent investment banks to 
                                                 
3 The $700 billion bail-out program does not contain such provisions. It has only weak language suggesting 
that new "golden parachutes" for executives leaving the firm might be in jeopardy. Existing golden 
parachutes would remain in place.  
  10disappear in the crisis; two went bankrupt, one was taken over by a commercial bank, and 
two converted themselves from investment banks to financial conglomerates. The SEC 
was responsible for regulating investment banks, but it required only voluntary 
compliance with its rules and never even read the compliance reports submitted by the 
banks – yet another example of ‘phantom’ regulation. Investment banks need to be tightly 
regulated.  
 
6. Implement a financial pre-cautionary principle. 
Once the financial regulatory structure is extended to all important financial institutions, 
as we propose in point 5, it would be possible to implement a regulatory precautionary 
principle with respect to new products and processes created by financial innovation 
similar in principle to the one used by the US Food and Drug Administration to 
determine whether new drugs should be allowed on the market. Destructive innovations 
were at the center of crisis-creation. Proposal 1 mentioned that Spanish banks had to ask 
permission from the Bank of Spain to create off-balance-sheet SIVs. This principle could 
be extended to all financial institutions and all important proposed financial innovations. 
Regulators would determine whether these innovations were likely to increase systemic 
fragility. Typically, the regulatory authority would do as the Spanish authorities did: tell 
the financial institution that as long as they could raise sufficient capital to insure that the 
risk to that institution was minimal, they could implement it. Regulators would be 
empowered to monitor the evolution of the innovation to make sure that it did not 
threaten systemic stability. However, there would be cases in which the regulatory 
authority would prohibit the innovation on the grounds that even with more capital, it 
would have serious negative externalities for the system. China’s system of regulation 
includes a strict policy of ‘anything not specifically permitted is prohibited.’ When asked 
what other countries could learn from China’s regulatory system, Liao Min, director-
general and acting head of the general office of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, replied that “Chinese financial institutions needed CBRC approval to 
launch individual product types, making it nearly impossible for exotic financial 
instruments, such as the ones blamed for the subprime crisis, to exist in China.” As a 
result of this practice, “Chinese banks have emerged relatively unscathed from the global 
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subprime crisis,” May 28, 2006”). Until South Korea accelerated the liberalization of its 
financial system in the mid-1990s, its government maintained a list of acceptable banking 
practices. Financial institutions had to get regulators’ permission to do anything not on 
the list. We suggest careful consideration of the “anything not specifically permitted is 
prohibited” principle. 
 
7. Restrict the growth of financial assets through counter-cyclical capital 
requirements.  
A number of the previous suggestions might help restrict the excessive growth of 
financial assets in the boom. But they may not, by themselves, eliminate the excessive 
growth of financial assets. As a number of observers have noted, asset creation is 
extremely pro-cyclical (see, for example, Wray, 2008). As asset prices rise, bank capital 
rises as well, so banks can increase loans until they hit regulatory capital constraints. This 
lending leads to a rising demand for securities and thus higher security prices, which 
allows the process to continue. To assure control of the rate of expansion of financial 
assets, regulators should impose counter-cyclical capital-asset ratios (See Adrian and 
Shin, 2008.) Spain experimented with such a policy. “Since 2002 the Bank of Spain has 
had something called a “dynamic provisioning” regime, where bank provisions go up 
when lending is growing quickly… Over the cycle the effect is neutral, but the timing of 
provisioning should make the troughs less deep and the peaks less vertiginous” (The 
Economist, “Spanish Steps,” May 17, 2008). Though Spanish regulators did not impose 
this policy with sufficient vigor, its experience is suggestive.  
 
8. Implement lender-of-last-resort actions with a sting. 
Institutions might be too big to fail, but no CEO should be. The CEOs of the seven 
largest investment banks received a total of $3.6 billion from 2004-07, yet the market 
capitalization of their firms declined by $364 billion from their peak values, an average 
fall of 49 percent. As long as there is financial capitalism, there will be a need for the 
some lender of last resort bailouts, even if all of these proposed policies are implemented. 
But a key distinction must be made between the financial institution itself and the agents 
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management, key traders and other richly rewarded operators. These rainmakers must be 
made to pay significantly when their firms are bailed out. As things currently stand, the 
perverse incentives embodied in financial firms’ asymmetric reward structure are 
underwritten by the central bank, which creates extreme moral hazard. 
 
9. Create a bailout fund financed by Wall Street. 
When the FDIC rescues failing commercial and savings banks, it uses insurance funds 
paid for by the banks themselves, not by the taxpayer. A similar insurance scheme should 
be created to finance bailouts for other kinds of financial institutions. The government 
should impose a small transactions tax on all security sales. (See Pollin 2005 for a general 
discussion of the transaction tax.) The tax rate might be calibrated to generate about $100 
billion in annual tax revenue. The fund would typically accumulate hundreds of billion of 
dollars in normal and boom times prior to the outbreak of a financial downturn. If 
effective regulations are put in place that prevent a truly dangerous risk buildup in the 
expansion phase of the financial cycle, the fund should have more than enough money to 
rescue those institutions that fail in the downturn.  
 
We conclude with the important and obvious caveat that none of these proposals 
nor any other serious new regulations will be implemented unless there is a dramatic 
change in the political economy of regulation. Over recent decades, top officials at the 
Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Treasury, and elsewhere either believed in the theory of 
efficient capital markets and the celebratory narrative of the New Financial Architecture, 
or at least acted as if they did. Alan Greenspan was until recently the most important 
financial market regulator in the world as well as a disciple of free-market ideologue Ayn 
Rand. According to the Wall Street Journal “Mr. Greenspan says he didn’t get heavily 
involved in regulatory matters in part because his laissez-faire philosophy was often at 
odds with the goals of the laws Congress had tasked the Fed with enforcing” (Wall Street 
Journal, “Did Greenspan add to subprime woes,” June 9, 2007). Moreover, regulators 
move to and from Wall Street in a kind of revolving door relationship. Henry Paulson, 
the current U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, was CEO at Goldman Sachs and Robert E. 
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Co-Chairman of Citi Group prior to becoming Treasury Secretary. It is never clear – 
perhaps even to them – whether they represent Wall Street or the American people when 
they make important decisions. For example, the original bailout bill presented to 
Congress by Secretary Paulson and vigorously supported by Fed Chairman Bernanke was 
a clear attempt to deliver $700 billion to Wall Street without any effective protection of 
the public interest.    
We will not be able to enact adequate reforms until two fundamental changes take 
place. First, the mainstream theory of efficient financial markets that is the foundation of 
support for the NFA must be replaced by the realistic financial market theories associated 
with John Maynard Keynes and Hyman Minsky. Recent events should convince any 
rational economist that the theory of efficient capital markets should be rejected once and 
for all, though it is far from clear that this ideologically grounded vision will in fact 
disappear. Second, there must be a broad political mandate in support of serious financial 
regulatory reform. For too long the Lords of Finance have corrupted the political process. 
Congress and the President have acted in recent decades as if they were paid employees 
of financial market interests, which many of them were. Perhaps anger over the $700 
billion dollars and the likely recession can galvanize the needed political support for 
change. The key is to channel the anger into pressure for a new "New Deal" in 
government regulation of financial markets. 
Until we have regulatory institutions empowered by law to control financial 
markets and force them to act in the public interest and we populate them with well-
trained officials who believe in serious regulation, we will continue down the disastrous 
path we have been following for the past three decades.  
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